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Key sentence: 
Emerging trends from the developing venture capital industries of three smaller peripheral 
economies (Finland, New Zealand and Estonia), demonstrate that government policy can 
overcome scale and distance barriers to assist in establishing venture capital to support 
innovative potential high growth ventures. 
Supporting sentences: 
Eight common policy themes for successful venture capital development are: new venture  
stimulation; dedicated finance policy institutions; stable, internationally harmonised tax and  
regulations; business angel development; inward investment; international venture capital  
fund development; smooth pipeline of investment; effective investment exit market. 
    
Venture capital policy development themes are interconnected, requiring a holistic  
ecosystem approach. 
 
A blueprint for successful small peripheral economy venture capital development requires an  
initial phase of new venture demand stimulation and ensuing simultaneity of policies to  




Private venture capital (VC) can play a crucial role in assisting potential high growth 
innovative venture start-ups and scale-up, and their contribution to economic growth (Lerner, 
2010; Baldock and Mason, 2015; Cumming et al, 2016). However, it is concentrated 
geographically, both globally and within countries (Mason, 2007; Avdeitchikova, 2012). In 
response, policy-makers in countries with VC gaps have introduced initiatives intended to 
increase supply. Indeed, Lerner (2010) has observed globally that most established VC 
markets have been underpinned by government support. Government support has taken two 
forms (Murray, 2007; Murray et al, 2012). The initial approach was the creation of state 
owned VC funds that were managed by government employees or private sector managers 
engaged by the state. However, these schemes have generally failed to generate sustainable 
private sector-led VC (Lerner, 2009; Nightingale et al, 2009; Cumming, 2014; Grilli and 
Murtinu, 2014; Munari and Toschi, 2015). Over the past quarter century state owned and 
managed funds have been superseded by hybrid funds, where government invests alongside 
private investors in privately managed funds, often on different terms and conditions, to 
reduce the risk and enhance returns for private investors. However, despite recent papers 
(Baldock, 2016, Cumming and Johan, 2016) suggesting improved impacts, concerns persist 
about the effectiveness of government VC initiatives in VC-deficient economies, providing 
further momentum to the recurring debate on the appropriate design of government venture 
capital initiatives. 
Small peripheral economies (SPEs) experience deficiencies in their VC development on 
account of their size, lack of innovative businesses and distance from the locations in which 
VC firms are located. Where VC succeeds in becoming sustainably established, it is related to 
achieving a critical mass of ‘smart money in smart places’ (Block et al. 2017). Governments 
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in SPE countries have therefore been particularly active in seeking to address these 
deficiencies in order to stimulate VC investment activity. However, these disadvantages of 
SPEs create particular challenges for government to develop effective initiatives  
This paper presents a unique insight into government strategies to develop VC in three SPEs 
– Finland, New Zealand and Estonia. It demonstrates emerging trends for what is working 
well or less well at different stages of the national VC development (Avnimelech and Teubel, 
2006; Avnimelech et al, 2005). This contemporary review and critique of government VC 
policy provides a theoretical VC ecosystem development framework for the study. The paper 
then discusses the lessons learned from the three SPEs and presents a blueprint for SPE 
governments to develop more cohesive and comprehensive ecosystem for sustainable VC.    
 
ADDRESSING THE CRITIQUE OF GOVERNMENT VC – DEVELOPING AN 
ECOSYSTEM APPROACH 
Lerner (2010) provides a set of principles for government development of private VC. These 
draw on perceived best practice mainly from the developmental government VC fund 
programme models adopted in Israel (Yozma, established 1992) and New Zealand (New 
Zealand Venture Investment Fund, established 2002). From another perspective, Gilson’s 
(2003) simultaneity theory for engineering VC recognises that for VC to flourish in a country 
it requires a range of micro-economic VC design and macro-economic institutional, 
regulatory and entrepreneurial development programmes operating in parallel (Cumming and 
Johan, 2016; Lin, 2017). Evolutionary models of VC development (Avnimelech and Tuebel, 
2006; Hwang and Horrowitt, 2012) suggest that government policy will be phased and need 
to address place specific challenges, particularly during the early development phases. For 
example, focusing primarily on the national regulatory, institutional and entrepreneurial 
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environments before adopting international outreach programmes (such as diaspora related 
investment and multi-national VC fund development). Whilst Lerner (2010) pays particular 
attention to VC design issues, no one has yet fully addressed the specific needs of 
engineering VC in SPEs. This suggests that a contemporary review of public VC needs to 
include design, entrepreneurial ecosystem and institutional regulatory theory, cast within an 
evolutionary development framework, as outlined in Table 1.  
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
 (i) VC design 
The lack of effectiveness of government VC funds (GVCFs) is widely attributed to various 
design issues (Lerner, 2010; Cumming and Johan, 2016; Baldock, 2016). Leleux and 
Surlemont (2003) and Armour and Cumming (2006) identify how crowding-out of private 
VC by GVCFs leads to failure to increase aggregate VC volume. GVCFs have also exhibited 
poorer performing portfolio companies than their private independent VC (IVC) counterparts 
(Nightingale et al, 2009; Bertoni and Tykvova, 2015; Grilli and Murtinu, 2014) in terms of 
innovation (e.g. patenting) and sales turnover growth. UK research (NAO, 2009; Munari and 
Toschi, 2015) found that smaller regional GVCFs performed poorly due to: weak 
management; thin markets with insufficient investible potential high growth (PHG) SME 
opportunities; insufficient funding (Murray, 1994, 1999); restrictions on investment (e.g. state 
aid caps); and inability to leverage follow-on funding investment. Other international studies 
(Bertoni and Tykvova, 2015; Brander et al. 2015; Colombo et al. 2016) suggest that GVC 
becomes more successful in terms of IPO and trade sales exits when combined with 
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independent VC (IVC) in portfolio companies, suggesting complementarity effects. However, 
as VCs generally invest close to their home location this outcome disproportionately benefits 
regions that are already abundant with IVC.  
 
Whilst these studies are highly critical of GVCF, they are largely based on pre-Global 
Financial Crisis (GFC) data and pre-date the creation of hybrid private co-financed and led 
GVCFs (Baldock, 2016). From the supply-side it can be seen that many of Lerner’s VC 
design requirements have subsequently been addressed, primarily through adoption of the 
hybrid model of private VC-led funds (Murray, 2007; Murray et al. 2012; Baldock and North, 
2015; Cumming and Johan, 2016). Hybrid GVCFs address Lerner’s principles as follows: 
they are led by experienced private VC fund managers; leverage private investment to 
increase fund size and meet the full funding needs of PHG SMEs (Cumming, 2014; Baldock, 
2016); target specific stage, sector and locations, whilst seeking to avoid overly prescriptive 
thin markets such as narrow technology sectors and university spin-outs (Brown and Mason, 
2014; Brown, 2016); typically operate as Limited Partnership (LP) legal entities with a 
minimum 10 year lifespan, which can be extended to accommodate longer horizon ‘long 
game’ investment, enabling portfolio firms to exit at optimal times to maximise returns; 
undertake regular evaluations to avoid agency failure through for example mission creep 
(Murray et al. 2009), avoid crowding-out, and maintain market relevance in tackling VC 
finance gaps (Cumming, 2014; Baldock and North, 2015). This hybrid approach also leaves 
investment decisions to private fund managers, with government typically operating as arms-
length investor, but offers flexibility of programme adjustment in alignment to changing 
finance market requirements.  
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However, as Lerner (2010) recognised, VC design is only part of the equation. The creation 
of GVCFs assumes that there is a significant pool of PHG SMEs for VC to invest in to scale-
up. This assumption is invalid. SPEs have a problem of thin markets (Nightingale et al. 2009) 
lacking sufficient PHG SMEs capable of achieving the commercial scale-up success that 
generates the exceptionally high financial returns sought by VC investors (Mason and Brown, 
2013).  
 
(ii) Entrepreneurial and financial ecosystems 
Lerner (2010) and Cumming et al (2014) recognise the importance of entrepreneurial 
ecosystem development to avoid thin markets and generate sufficient viable deal flow of 
PHG SMEs for VC investment. Demand-side stimulation requires an entrepreneurial support 
system that involves entrepreneurship training and investment readiness programmes (Mason 
and Kwok, 2010) and facilitates international connectivity (Bathelt et al, 2004). This latter 
point is vital to SPEs. Because of their small size and remoteness from major centres of 
population PHG SMEs in SPEs require a born global, wider international market approach to 
scale-up to attract VC investment (Deakins et al. 2015). In order to maximise entrepreneurial 
development both Lerner (2010) and Mustar and Wright (2010) stress the importance of 
leveraging the local R&D base through facilitating interconnectivity between industry and 
university R&D.  
 
Critically, Lerner (2010) recognises the need for learning to connect between demand and 
supply-sides of the ecosystem. From the demand-side this suggests a pipeline approach 
whereby sufficient quality PHG venture propositions can stimulate critical mass of activity 
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within SPEs and attract VC (Brown and Mason, 2014; Colombo et al 2016). From the 
supply-side this requires: informed institutional investors (including pension funds, 
endowments etc.) willing to accept early-stage equity investment risks and invest in VC 
funds; large professional VC funds of sufficient scale and managerial competence to make 
initial and follow-on investments and grow portfolio firms until attractive exit opportunities 
are identified; and a supportive network of high quality advisors (Nightingale et al, 2009). 
Lerner’s (2010) global perspective is important here, pointing to the benefits of hiring and 
learning from experienced overseas fund managers in the successful GVCF programmes 
operating in Israel and New Zealand – a finding underlined by similar positive experiences in 
Europe and the UK (Baldock and North, 2015; Baldock, 2016). Lerner (2010) also highlights 
the importance of professional intermediaries (e.g. accountants; lawyers) in facilitating the 
development of a financing ecosystem (Kenney and Patton, 2005).  
 
Recent literature also emphasizes the ‘smart money’ role of VC fund managers through their 
hands-on management and guidance of their portfolio companies (Baldock and North, 2015). 
However, pan-European research (Luukkonen et al, 2013) has demonstrated that IVC and 
GVCFs make different types of value added contribution. IVCs provided more support for 
professionalization, changing the management team, exit orientation, and also made greater 
impact on accelerating growth and providing credibility to other investors. Cumming et al 
(2014) attribute poorer exit performance in GVCFs to their inability to monitor, nurture and 
mentor their investee businesses as effectively as IVCs. Similarly, Shäfer and Shilder (2009) 
suggest that German public sector VC funds may not be as ‘smart’ as IVCs in terms of adding 
value. This suggests that more should be done to enhance Lerner’s principle of recruiting 
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experienced successful high quality IVC fund managers to lead GVCF (Hood, 2000; Munari 
and Toschi, 2015).  
 
Finance ecosystem theory also highlights the crucial interconnectivity of evolving finance 
escalators (Nightingale et al 2009; North et al 2013) to provide continuity of different forms 
of finance, from seed VC and business angels through to later stage VC and exit, typically via 
a trade sale or IPO (Initial Public Offering). An extension of this is the interconnectivity of 
international VC and investment markets in attracting inward investment (Lerner, 2010) and 
enhanced exit values (Baldock, 2016).  
 
Increasing attention has therefore been given to how GVCFs can provide ongoing scale-up 
finance and avoid potential shortfalls in follow-on funding. Syndication between VCs and 
business angels can spread seed and early stage risk, generate greater funding streams and 
potential later stage and international VC connections which can open up global markets 
(Hopp, 2010) by breaking down the barriers of distance. Where once VCs would not travel 
more than one hour to portfolio firms they now syndicate internationally with key lead angels 
and VCs located in other countries. Improved communications systems (including broadband 
and Skype) have assisted this process. Evidence also suggests improved physical connectivity 
through fast direct city flight linkages, such as London City to Dublin or Berlin, have helped 
(Baldock, 2016). However, this works against peripheral regions and countries which suffer 




Central to the VC investment model is the need for successful exits to realise financial returns 
for funds and their investors which typically occurs through acquisition by a larger company. 
Whilst patchy, empirical evidence suggests that acquisition of young growing companies can 
adversely affect regional economic development in the longer term (Foreman-Peck and 
Nicholls, 2013; Carpentier and Suret, 2014; Xiao, 2015). Moreover, small exits are unlikely to 
generate significant wealth for shareholders and investors, thereby limiting the potential for 
entrepreneurial recycling (Mason and Harrison, 2006). Companies therefore need to be able to 
access several rounds of finance so that they can reach a significant size before an exit occurs, 
by which time they will be anchored in the local economy and less likely to be relocated 
following acquisition. Other exit mechanisms which avoid the sale of the company are also 
desirable. The most obvious is an IPO flotation on the stock market. However, only a small 
number of VC exits occur via IPO and, over time, VCs have become less attracted to IPO 
(Chaplinasky and Gupta-Mulerjee, 2013). Lerner (2010) therefore also highlights the need for 
effective VC exit markets, specifically small cap public feeder markets, like the UK 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM), and First North in Sweden and Finland, which provide 
opportunities for local businesses to exit VC and remain locally owned (Baldock, 2015). But 
here again, peripheral economies are less connected to public markets. Amini et al. (2012) 
highlight the under-representation of AIM-listed companies in the peripheral regions in the 
UK.  
 
(iii) Institutional and Regulatory approaches 
Gilson’s (2003) VC engineering simultaneity requirements explicitly tackle the need for an 
appropriate and attractive institutional and regulatory environment for VC to develop. This is 
further developed in the emerging economies VC literature (Lingelbach, 2015, Lin, 2017) 
10 
 
which outlines the need for stable government, transparent light touch regulations and 
institutional operations. These include, for example, suitable low tax inducements, free 
international movement of skilled labour (notably to import experienced, highly skilled fund 
managers) and familiar Limited Partnership VC legal operations which guarantee the 10-year 
fund operation cycles that are attractive to more established US and European investment 
funds (Lerner, 2010). There is also a need for portfolio ventures and support services to 
operate in a transparent way through adoption of internationally accepted accountancy 
standards that establish legitimacy and trust (Lerner et al, 2013). Overall, as VC is a ‘long 
game’ political, regulatory and economic stability is critical to provide the foundation of trust 
for investors (Li and Zahra, 2012).  
 
From an interventionist policy perspective, it is also important to note that GVCFs are an 
economic development mechanism to fill funding gaps which occur where IVCs consider the 
risk-reward ratio insufficient to enter the market (Baldock, 2016). In seeking to fill this gap 
the focus of GVCFs is likely to be on funding business propositions that are viable but may 
not offer the potential returns to attract IVCs. This means that GVCFs are unlikely to achieve 
the performance of IVCs, but may well result in other forms of positive externality gains to 
the economy, such as R&D spillovers and indirect employment generation for subcontractors 
(Baldock and North, 2015; Wilson and Silva, 2013; Griliches, 1992).  
 
VC ecosystem building takes time – many decades - with Cetindamar (2003) establishing that 
it goes through development phases. Avnimelech et al. (2005) in their comparison of the 
development of the US and Israeli VC markets establish three key phases of development. 
The Israeli example is pertinent, for whilst it was founded on the peculiarities of the defence 
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industry, it is representative of a relatively small economy, situated a long way from the more 
established pools of US and to a lesser extent European VC markets in the early 1990s. The 
first, pre emergent phase, is where entrepreneurship and R&D, such as through Universities 
(Mustar and Wright, 2010), combine to generate demand for external early stage VC risk 
finance. Second, the emergent phase is where private VC develops to extend risk financing 
beyond that of the individual business angel and to provide an alternative to the limitations of 
corporate investment. Finally, the consolidation phase, is where private VC becomes 
sustainable without public intervention.  
Whether we take a cycle of development or a simultaneity engineering perspective, the 
overarching requirements for establishing sustainable VC are considerable, requiring the 
bringing together of human and network capital to generate on the one hand potential high 
growth ventures to attract VC funding and on the other hand a sufficiently skilled group of 
private VCs capable of investing successfully to generate a sustainable industry. All of this 
requires a suitably constructed institutional, regulatory and policy framework which takes on 
best practice and adapts to local and international market conditions (Lerner et al, 2013).   
Finally, from an institutional perspective, there is growing support for specialist oversight 
organisations with control or lobbying powers for more comprehensive and cohesive VC 
finance ecosystem development. Mazzucato and Penna (2016) and Breedon (2012) argue that 
such organisations can manage and control the finance escalator, effectively developing and 
monitoring interventions to ensure that there is a smooth supply and operation of VC funds 
from seed stage through to later ‘series A-B’ funds and beyond to an effective IPO exit or 
trade sale market. This can overcome one of the weaknesses of traditional GVCFs which take 
a vertical approach, only making investments within certain investment size and business 
stage and sector categories (e.g. seed investing in tech start-ups). Alongside this role these 
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institutions can encourage cross-border collaborations to ensure greater fund scale and 
coverage which might be particularly effective for developing VC in peripheral countries 
(Dittmer et al., 2014; Mazzucato and Penna, 2016). Furthermore, these institutions can lobby 
for VC-friendly policies, such as investor tax incentives and international regulatory 
harmonisation to encourage inward investment, which Lerner (2010) advocates for 
entrepreneurial ecosystem support and development. 
 
METHODOLOGY AND PROFILE DEFINITION OF SMALL PERIPHERAL 
ECONOMY (SPE) CASE STUDIES 
The paper is based on in depth case study analysis of VC development in three national SPEs; 
Finland, New Zealand and Estonia. A multi-method approach has been taken, combining: (i) 
secondary quantitative and review data of peripheral, smaller national economies to assist 
with selection of the 3 case study areas; (ii) 15 in-depth interviews and follow up 
correspondence with 5 key experts from each of the case study areas. This predominantly 
qualitative case study approach required sufficient numbers of in-depth structured interviews 
with a range of key informant experts with contemporary and recent historical knowledge of 
the local VC industry and its operation (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2016). 
 
The interviewees (Table 2) comprised national policymakers, industry practitioners such as 
VC fund managers (including the European Investment Fund) and business angel networks, 
leading trade equity associations (including the European Venture Capital Association) and 
academic VC and equity market experts. Interviews typically took place by telephone and 
were at least one hour in duration, following a consistently applied exploratory topic guide 
approach (North et al, 2013; Baldock, 2015). Where possible, information was recorded and 
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transcribed and then sent to the interviewees for checking and clarification. Follow-up 
interviews, email correspondence and supporting literature were used for further development 
of key emerging themes. This ‘triangulation’ approach which combines qualitative interviews 
with corroborative secondary data sources is well established (Creswell, 2003) and provides 
considerable inductive case insight through structured review and pattern matching - trend 
analysis (Yin, 2016) to reveal why problems occur and how they are addressed and, whether, 
successfully resolved. This approach has potential for identifying good practice that may be 
transferrable to other developing VC economies (see for example, Lerner et al, 2013). 
 
 
Case study selection followed a set of criteria based on a combination of the literature review 
and data work. Key criteria used were relatively small size of the economy in terms of 
population, entrepreneurial ecosystem (referring to the Global Entrepreneurial Index), and 
size of the national VC market (Table 3). VC markets of varying maturity – at different 
stages of development – were selected, in order to examine more closely the contemporary 
problems and coping strategies adopted in these markets (Centindamar, 2003; Avnimelech et 
al. 2005). The countries were also selected in terms of their peripherality in terms of distance 
from and access to major concentrations of global VC and potential exit investment markets 
(e.g. for IPOs or trade sales).    
 
(Insert Table 2) 
 
(Insert Table 3) 
 
In order to examine VC policy evolution a further consideration in the selection of cases was 
that they should have experienced at least a decade of VC development and related 
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entrepreneurial finance ecosystem policy. The three country SPEs are rated within the top 25 
entrepreneurial countries when gauged by the Global Entrepreneurship Index (2016). In many 
respects this supports the view that these SPEs are generally ‘getting it right’ and so have 
important lessons and potential best practice (Lerner et al, 2013) to impart on other SPEs 
(Table 3).    
The three SPEs are at various stages of VC development. Estonia, the least populous (1.3m) 
is the least mature VC economy. New Zealand (4.5m population) is the most remote. Finland 
is the largest (5.4m population) and most mature VC economy (Table3). All face the 
challenge of being small economies with low volume investment opportunities and limited 
indigenous sources of VC. They are also peripheral to VC concentrations, either in global or 
continental terms. Finland and Estonia are located on the outer periphery of Northern Europe, 
the nearest substantial VC market being Stockholm, situated almost 500 kilometres away and 
across the Baltic Sea. New Zealand is remote, being located over 2000 kilometres across the 
Tasman Sea from the largest Australasian VC centre in Sydney.  
These counties all currently have active policies to develop VC. The longest established VC 
market is Finland, which in 1967 created SITRA (Finnish National Fund for R&D) and 
shareholdings in Sponsor, the country’s first VC company. However, private VC market 
growth was stimulated only following the adoption of private LP legal status in the late 1980s 
alongside public sector support (Luukkonen, 2006). New Zealand’s (Lerner, 2010; Lerner et 
al., 2005) government backed VC programmes were created in the early 2000s, whilst the 
youngest VC market is Estonia where venture capital was stimulated by the acquisition of 
Skype which triggered the recycling of this finance through the establishment of a VC fund in 
2005 by the local ‘Skype 4’ entrepreneurs (see. Figure 1).  Finland’s market home VC market 
has stabilised since the GFC, but this hides a rapid increase in foreign investment, which has 
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nearly doubled from 139m Euros in 2012 to 232m Euros in 2016. New Zealand’s VC market 
has recovered well since GFC, whilst Estonia’s VC market has increased rapidly with the 
recent introduction of the EU and state backed Baltic Investment Fund (BIF). Whilst the 
maturing Finnish and New Zealand seed and early stage VC markets are becoming more 
buoyant an increasingly common observation is of a shortage of later stage series A-B 
commercialisation funding (FVCA, 2018; EY, 2017).       
(insert Figure 1) 
 
SYSTEM ANALYSIS AND EMERGING THEMES 
Our analysis1 of the approaches adopted to the development of VC in these SPEs identifies 
eight key themes. These can be grouped within the three-tier system (VC design, ecosystem, 
institution) discussed earlier that emerges from Lerner’s (2010) systematic principles, review 
of contemporary GVC theory and policy literature (Table 1). Each theme is discussed in 
relation to this system, drawing on key examples, which indicate the new directions in which 
government approaches to VC is taken. 
VC Design (1) 
Theme 1: An inter-regional, rather than local, funding model   
VC scale is critical as Nightingale et al (2009) and Lerner (2010) highlight. Although 
operating in different contexts, several of the SPEs have adopted new funding models that 
operate at a larger geographical scale than the home country to alleviate the investment 
                                                          
1 Involving extensive secondary data, literature review, policy evaluation and key informant interviews with 
local VC industry experts 
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limitations arising from small scale, and thereby attract additional investment into the local 
market.  
 
Estonia exhibits a trans-national approach, collaborating with the other Baltic States through 
the Baltic Innovation Fund (BIF), launched by the European Investment Fund (EIF) in 2012 
to boost equity investments into PHG SMEs in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. BIF is 
investing €100m into private equity and VC funds focusing on the Baltic States over four 
years from January 2013, through a ‘fund of funds’ process to attract additional private 
finance and implement best practice market standards for equity investing in businesses.  
New Zealand’s Venture Investment Fund (NZVIIF) has established, with NZ government 
cornerstone funding, the Global firm Day One (GD1) joint-managed fund between Auckland 
and Taipei based private VCs. This long-planned fund aims for an eventual closing value of 
NZ$45m. It has also received international investment from the US, Singapore and Hong 
Kong. GD1 was formally announced in February 2018 and will focus on seed funding New 
Zealand start-ups focusing on global markets, with a proportion expected to locate in Taiwan 
as a springboard for Asian market development.  
 
Entrepreneurial-Financial Ecosystem (2) 
 
Theme 2: An international mind- and action-set 
Developing an international mind-set is a key theme of Lerner (2010). This is evident in all of 
the cases. Specifically, these SPEs are increasingly seeking to attract international investment 
and expertise. Generally, seed and early stage capital investing is undertaken by investors 
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with ‘boots on the ground’; locally based investors are more likely to have the networks to 
identify investable deals. Such investments require frequent, intensive investor-investee 
interaction, favouring geographical proximity. However, proximity is less important in later 
stage deals. Indeed, the value-added from non-local investors often derives from being based 
elsewhere – typically Silicon Valley - and can assist company market global expansion.  
These SPEs are pursuing this strategy by developing ‘pipelines’ to investors in other regions 
and countries, developing links between local and non-local VCs through inward investment 
VC, including pitching events and sector-based showcase events. It should be noted that such 
activity is more practically achievable for countries that have already passed through the pre-
emergent VC stage (Avnimelech et al, 2005) of entrepreneurial venture development. A 
notably important role has been the initial entrepreneurial and R&D development in 
Universities that stimulates new global market aspiring PHG ventures. This combined with 
the later development of  international linkages between Universities, R&D centres and 
accelerators has attracted foreign investment (Mustar and Wright, 2010). The following 
examples illustrate this theme. 
 New Zealand has adopted a consistently ‘external facing’ approach in the design and 
development of its early stage and growth finance market. This includes establishing a 
joint GVCF with Taiwan, importing expertise from Israel and the USA to help 
develop VC and angel market investment, and developing international linkages 
between New Zealand VC and angel investors and VC agencies in the USA and Asia.  
 Finland’s innovation policy assists globally facing new businesses through 
establishing a global network of technology and financing centres linked to North 
America and Asia. On the supply-side, a common criticism is that despite 
considerable government investment, VC funds in Finland remain too small. One way 
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this is being addressed is via catalysing international VC funds to invest in Finnish 
firms. Finland’s developing global market approach also allows public backed VC 
funds to invest outside of the country where this can be seen to be widening and 
strengthening portfolios and encouraging further foreign investment.  
 Estonia has developed the so-called ‘Estonian Mafia’ model2 which encourages 
global facing start-up companies. This began with the location of a government office 
in Silicon Valley promoting innovation exchange between Berkeley and Stanford 
Universities and Tallinn Tech University, allowing pre-seed entrepreneurs the 
opportunity to learn what the US accelerators required. Over time this has resulted in 
high success rates for Estonian entrepreneurs enrolling in US and UK accelerator 
programmes and reciprocal US and UK VC investments into Estonian businesses.  
 
Theme 3: Focused demand-side stimulation 
The development of entrepreneurial ecosystems is widely evident across the SPEs. 
Avnimelech et al (2005) indicate that this is a necessary evolutionary precondition for their 
emergent VC stage to take place.  There is recognition that simply increasing the supply of 
finance will be ineffective. Without complementary demand side initiatives there is high risk 
that increased finance will be invested in businesses that lack the potential to grow. 
Consequently, new initiatives to increase VC supply must be accompanied by interventions 
to increase the demand for risk capital. Essentially, this comprises SME investment readiness 
programmes, initiatives to increase entrepreneurial activity, both technology start-ups and 
growth businesses, and a broader focus to align business support measures, notably export 
support and activity, all with the objective of fostering demand for VC.  
                                                          
2 Estonian Business Angel Network presentation 18/06/2014 
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 Interventions adopted in Finland to improve the demand side entrepreneurial 
competence gap include building start-up capability through an investment readiness 
programme, the introduction of tax incentives for business angels’ investments, the 
ICT-based Vigo accelerator programme, and the merger of three universities to create 
Aalto University as an explicitly innovation-focused institution and entrepreneurial 
cultural catalyst centre.   
 In Estonia, Tallinn Tech University formed the Tehnopol science park in 1998 to help 
foster an infrastructure for technology business start-ups, accelerate growth businesses 
and create an entrepreneurial culture facilitating spin-outs from five University R&D 
centres. It has developed an incubator with accommodation for up to 20 businesses, 
attracted over 150 existing businesses to locate on-site, developed specialisms in 
biotech and mechatronics and forged close ties with international universities and 
accelerators3. 
In summary, all of the SPEs see the development of the early stage and growth finance 
market as only one component in a much more comprehensive set of initiatives to increase 
entrepreneurial activity that include incubators/accelerators, mentoring schemes, events and 
competitions and the development of ‘entrepreneurial campuses’.  
 
Theme 4: Exit-centric approach to market development 
The importance that Lerner (2010) and Mason (2017) ascribe to exit markets is now widely 
accepted. There is a recognition by the SPEs that the amount of money invested is not an 
appropriate metric to measure the success of early stage and growth finance initiatives, 
particularly for GVCFs. Exits – whether in the form of acquisitions or IPOs - are essential to 
                                                          
3 http://www.tehnopol.ee/en/About/Team/Supervisory-Board  
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generate economic benefits through business growth and the recycling of wealth and learning 
by the entrepreneurs and other shareholders (Mason and Harrison, 2006). They also create 
signaling effects to investors (local and non-local) and provide role models to potential 
entrepreneurs in the domestic market. However, many – possibly most – investments by 
business angels and VCs are not commercially successful, dominated by failed and ‘living 
dead’ investment4i For example, recent New Zealand Venture Investment Fund reporting 
(NZVIF, 2017 p.8), indicated that the current portfolio in 10 year funds established from 
2007 is un-exited and ‘largely unrealised’.  
Estonia and New Zealand each demonstrate the impact that ‘blockbuster’ exits have on local 
economies. An excellent example is the ‘Skype Four’ software development programmers 
whose share of the $2.6bn sale of the company to Ebay in 2005 enabled the establishment of 
their own VC fund (Ambient Sound Investments). This success helped stimulate the 
development of the country’s VC market and provided a role model which has inspired a 
generation of tech entrepreneurs. Ambient Sound Investments (ASI) is a 100m Euro fund, 
investing directly into early stage ventures and into other funds - notably Karma Ventures 
Baltic States seed to series A technology fund in 2016. ASI has completed 21 early stage 
venture investments world-wide, including 4 with Estonian companies. In 2013 their 
Estonian-based portfolio company, specializing in blockchain technology and digital archive 
integrity achieved a successful MBO. 
In summary, policy makers must recognise that successful exits are key to the creation of a 
functioning and sustainable local VC market, both directly through the investment they create 
to be re-cycled in the local market, and indirectly by their demonstrator effect to others both 
internally and externally. However, these typically take time and to some extent are 
                                                          
4 These are investments in businesses that may generate sufficient revenue to survive but will not grow 
sufficiently to attract a buyer 
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serendipitous. Nevertheless, the implication is that both government and private investors 
need to adopt an exit-centric approach to making investments. 
 
Theme 5: A functioning finance pipeline 
There is broad recognition amongst the SPEs that the main funding gap is in the $250,000-
$3m range spanning seed VC to series A-B.  This is critical for the emergence of high growth 
firms: $250,000 represents the upper range raised from personal sources, grants and angel 
funding, while $3m is increasingly the bottom end of the private VC market. Co-investment 
funds - for example New Zealand Seed Co-investment Fund, established since 2006 - have 
effectively filled the bottom end of this gap. However, the funding of growth businesses is a 
pipeline, hence initiatives at one point in the funding escalator will have knock-on effects at 
other stages. For example, seed and start-up funds will create subsequent demand for follow-
on investments. It is therefore essential that all stages in the funding escalator have adequate 
supply, and that intervention does not occur at just one point.  
The series A-B gap is more apparent amongst more mature VC ecosystems where seed 
funding is established, but larger follow-on funding at the series A-B (pre and very early 
commercialisation) stage is lacking. This gap led to New Zealand forging inward investment 
links with the US and Taiwan and the creation of the GD1 fund. Furthermore, in Finland (the 
most mature VC market examined), recent seed funding has been amongst the highest in 
Europe as a proportion of GDP, with massive increases between 2010-16 in angel investing 
(8m rising to 53m Euros) and foreign investment (21m rising to 216m Euros). However, 
Finland’s established domestic VC investing which covers later investment stages has 
declined over the same period (from 87m to 80m Euros), leading to growing concerns over an 




It is also important to recognise that VC is not necessarily the appropriate source of finance at 
all stages. Sources of non-dilutive finance (e.g. grants and deferred loans) are particularly 
important for businesses at the pre-commercial stage. For example, Business Finland 
(formerly Tekes, the public agency supporting innovation) offers soft loans (with deferred 
repayment and up to 7 year term, at 1%) and grants for pre-commercial R&D innovation, 
with increased proportions of grant (65% compared with 50%) available to projects with 
international linkages. 
 
Theme 6: Effective business angel networks   
Developing the finance escalator also involves recognition of the importance of a strong 
business angel community not just as sources of early stage finance but also to provide 
‘smart’ money through the mentoring and advising that angels provide to their investee 
entrepreneurs. Angel communities feature strongly in Finland and New Zealand and where 
they are weaker, arguably in Estonia, this has been recognised as an important barrier to 
development of the wider equity finance market. Angels are increasingly organising 
themselves in managed angel groups, in some cases with government support. The size of 
these groups (from 10 to over 100 members) means that they have the financial resources and 
wider skills sets to make potentially smarter, larger, and follow-on, investments (Mason et al. 
2016). Governments are therefore seeking to support the development of angel groups as key 
partners in their VC initiatives, notably as partners in co-investment funds. New Zealand’s 
approach to developing its business angel base is particularly instructive. The emergence of 
over 15 angel networks (a large number, relative to the size of the country) has received 
policy support under the overarching operation of the NZVIF’s focused supply-side capacity 
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development intent, both through a co-investment fund and developing a suite of materials 
and systems (e.g. protocols, advice notes, resources) assisting increased capacity and 
discipline of the angel investment process (NZVIF, 2017).Estonia demonstrates how rapidly 
an organised angel network can establish international linkages and lever in private 
investment, transforming a previously barren seed stage equity market. The fledgling 
Estonian Business Angel Network (EstBAN) was established in 2012 with government 
catalyst funding to assist with administration, including 50 promotional events to generate 
interest and market knowledge. The first year5 generated 83 investments in 66 companies, 
representing over €4.6m, with over half of investments in pre-seed and early stage 
companies. Notably, 85% of investments were in syndication and 43% were outside of 
Estonia, into Estonian businesses that have relocated internationally, or through international 
investor links, largely enabled by close ties with angel networks in Finland (FiBAN), St 
Petersburg (SoBA) and Latvia. Within three years EstBAN membership grew to 71 angels, 
included international investors from USA and other parts of Europe, enhanced by the use of 
an online ‘AngelList’ style investment platform6.  
Where angel network seed investing is established, one way in which the ensuing series A-B 
finance gap can be at least partially addressed, is through government angel co-financing 
programmes. The success of the UK Angel Co-investment Fund established in 2013 (Owen 
and Mason, 2017) has led to a similar European Investment Fund (EIF) European Angel 
Fund which match-funds angel syndicate investments to generate more substantial early stage 
venture funding. In 2017 Finland established a 30m Euro joint Tekes-EIF funded European 
Angel Fund to enable angel investment to address its growing series A-B finance gap. 
 
                                                          
5 http://estban.ee/images/estban-the_first_year_in_retrospect.png ; http://estban.ee/about  
6 Estonian Business Angel Network presentation 18/06/2014 
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Institutional and Regulatory (3) 
Theme 7: An open and attractive regulatory system 
The emerging VC market literature strongly advocates the adoption of global standards and 
regulatory harmonisation approaches. This creates the necessary stability and confidence to 
attract skilled inward investment and develop the local investment market (Avnimelech et al, 
2005; Lerner, 2010; Lingelbach, 2015). It appears to be particularly important for each of our 
SPEs, where there has been concerted government effort to foster international collaboration 
by providing a more attractive regulatory market to encourage foreign inward investment. 
Estonia in particular has recognised that the lack of a LP legal structure has held back entry 
of skilled overseas private VCs into the market. Lerner (2010) noted that New Zealand 
adopted this approach in the early 2000s, enabling the government backed NZVIF to attract 
high performing US investors through its match funding approach.  
 
Alongside the provision of a more harmonized, internationally recognised regulatory 
environment for VC has been the provision of a more attractive, simplified tax regime to 
attract foreign companies and investors. For example, Finland now recognises that more 
foreign VC investment is required to stimulate the domestic market and improve business 
growth. One approach has been through the recently developed government backed Tekes 
annual €20m catalyst fund, which can relatively easily invest pari passu alongside foreign 
VCs investing in Finland and offers attractive tax concessions on investment returns.  
 
In summary, the clear trend to emerge from these SPEs is that they are working towards 
improved incentives and support for inward investment by non-local VCs, through a mix of 
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networking and promotion, tax incentives, co-finance schemes and the international 
regulatory harmonisation of VC activity.   
 
Theme 8: Dedicated institutions and agencies in immature markets 
 The SPEs exhibit a range of institutional contexts that largely reflect differences in the 
relative maturity and development of their various entrepreneurial early stage and growth 
finance markets. Where the market is less mature, such as in New Zealand, a dedicated SME 
finance agency has played an important wider policy setting and advocacy role than simply 
the management and distribution of finance. The NZVIF is central to developing New 
Zealand’s entrepreneurial finance sector, leading delivery of a VC Fund and a Seed Co-
investment Fund that has developed the angel investment market. It also plays wider policy 
advocacy and market development roles, helping maintain the momentum of industry 
development, providing consistent focus on building the capability of the investor community 
(e.g. bringing in skilled US VCs investors) as the key to creating a sustainable market 
(strongly advocated by Lerner, 2010).  
Such a model may not be appropriate in all cases. However, when the market is small, the 
networks are not fully formed, and significant public investment is required, they can help to 
provide policy consistency, delivery capacity, and provide a clear advocacy function to 
promote market growth. On the other hand, their absence or poor design can be detrimental to 
the development of VC markets. This is illustrated by government intervention in Finland’s 
entrepreneurial finance markets, the most established VC market examined. Veugelers et al. 
(2009) demonstrate that lack of co-ordination and control over a proliferating range of policy 
measures, which have included small, restricted regional funds and insufficient monitoring 
(advocated by Lerner, 2010; Murray et al., 2009), has led to under-performance of its 
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GVCFs. The funds with an evergreen approach experienced a lack of fund management 
performance incentive, leading to entrenchment and mission creep in supporting poor 
performing portfolio companies. Consequentially, these funds demonstrably failed to adapt to 
changing market needs over time, add value to portfolio business management, and 
encourage entrepreneurial activity (Murray et al, 2009).  
 
CONCLUSION: CREATING A BLUEPRINT ECOSYSTEM FOR SUSTAINABLE VC  
The paper supports the view (Lerner, 2010; Lerner et al 2013; Baldock and Mason, 2015; 
Cumming et al, 2016) that developing local sources of VC is a basic tenet of economic 
development policy-making. However, GVC initiatives to fill gaps in the supply of private 
IVC have generally been unsuccessful, often through failure to recognise that VC requires a 
supportive ecosystem in which to operate. This paper builds on the literature (Avnimelech, 
2005; Lerner, 2010; Baldock 2016), to offer a holistic overarching model based on evidence 
from the approaches of three SPEs which highlight how government initiatives have 
successfully fostered the development of venture capital to close the funding gap for young 
PHG businesses and thereby promote economic development.  
 
(Insert figure 2) 
 
Building on more recent contributions of Hwang and Horowitt (2012) and Wilson and Silva 
(2013), our research reveals eight strong, interconnected, themes that underpin the venture 
capital development policy in the three SPEs studied. From this we propose an overarching 
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entrepreneurial-financial ecosystem model (Figure 2) to provide a blueprint for future 
development of venture capital in SPEs. It is acknowledged that emerging SPE VC markets 
will be at different stages of development and exhibit different cultural and institutional 
characteristics. A fundamental point, underlined in Avnimelech et al (2005) is that an initial 
phase of entrepreneurial demand stimulation (3) is required to attract venture capital 
investment. Once this has occurred, as in our three SPE cases, a range of policies are then 
required simultaneously (Gilson, 2003) to successfully engineer VC development. The basic 
principles of the model apply to all of our cases and offer clear guidelines for future policy 
development in SPEs.  
 
The model highlights the key dual and interconnected roles of government regulatory/tax 
policy (7) and dedicated policy and delivery institutions (8). The latter may involve state 
investment banks, or holding funds, with the ability to provide comprehensive overarching 
policy to deliver government funding, including GVCFs. Our findings suggest that dedicated 
institutions (such as the NZVIF), are particularly well placed to plan and co-ordinate the 
range of different types of public financing instruments required, monitor their performance 
and adjust accordingly over time. They also provide an important lobbying mechanism in 
collecting evidence and advocating key wider government policy interventions that support 
entrepreneurial activity.  
 
The model also highlights the interconnectivity between the financing schemes (5) and a 
range of other factors required to facilitate the successful development of a small market VC 
ecosystem. These include linkages to entrepreneurial development through ongoing demand-
side stimulation policies (3) and to business angel investors (6) through the development of 
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enhanced business angel networks and co-financing arrangements to leverage greater 
investment in seed and early stage business financing.  
 
Supporting Lerner’s international thesis, the model also highlights the crucial importance of 
enlarging the SPE investment market through cross-border investing (2), which can increase 
the scale of venture capital, import expert investors to upskill the industry, open up global 
market connections and opportunities for portfolio firms and improve exit opportunities (4). 
There is also a need to grow the scale and market reach of regional and national GVCFs (1), 
enabling them to invest across borders (Dittmer et al., 2014), to ensure that they have 
sufficient size and capacity to develop a sustainable investment cycle and the encouragement 
of overseas business angel and VC investment (Hopp, 2010). This can be achieved in the 
following ways: supporting international business angel network and VC collaborations; 
GVC incentives to foreign VCs; international linkages between innovation institutions (e.g. 
universities, R&D centres); and assisting born global start-ups to enter overseas 
incubator/accelerators with encouragement of reciprocal foreign corporate accelerator 
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Table 1: A Contemporary Framework of VC Development Guidelines 
Literature strand Guidelines from the Existing Literature 
(i) VC design 
 
1. Private market led – investment by experienced private VCs 
2. Resist overengineering – avoid micro management 
3. Consider lead time – longer horizon investment 
4. Consider appropriate fund scale – not too small or big 
5. Regular evaluation – assess delivery and programme relevance 
6. Avoid agency problems – mission creep and self-serving 
7. Flexibility to adjust to changing market needs 
 
(ii) Entrepreneurial 
and SME Financial 
Ecosystems 
1. Develop entrepreneurial ecosystem – entrepreneurial 
education and international linkages 
2. Leverage R&D base – connect industry with R&D and 
universities 
3. Education – VC market knowledge; entrepreneur finance 
knowledge; network support base of wider professional 
intermediaries (e.g. Accountants & Lawyers) 
(iii) Institutional & 
Regulatory 
1. Create stable government and regulatory environment to 
develop national and international legitimacy and trust base 
2. Adopt global VC standards – notably Limited Partnership and 
transparent accounting operations  
3. Facilitate global interconnectivity – free market approach to 
skilled labour movement, encouraging business and trade, offer 
suitably low tax inducements 
4. Understand that VC is a long game, requiring holistic integrated 
policy which may be phased, but also requires simultaneity of 







Table 2: Structured Interviews by country and respondent type 
Respondent Type Estonia Finland New Zealand European* 
Policymaker 1 1 1  
Government agency/VC 1 1 1 1 
Business Angels 1 1 1  
Trade Association 1 1  1 
Academics 1 1 2  
*European: includes 2 additional interviews with: (i) European Investment Fund; (ii) European 










Table 3: Key Population, Venture Capital Investment and GDP Metrics 
 
Measure Finland New Zealand Estonia 
Population 5.4m 4.5m 1.3m 
Distance from VC 
centre in km 
484 2155 426 
VC centre investment 
2015-16 (Euro)* 
Stockholm 760m  Sydney 237m  Stockholm 760m  
Maturity of VC market 50 years 20 years 15 years 
Total VC investment 
2012 (Euro)* 
79.1m  20.8m  8.6m  
Global Entrepreneurship Index (GEI) Score% and top 25 Rankings 2016 
Policy 74 (19) 96 (1) 84 (3) 
Infrastructure 76 (4) 66 (21) 55 (-) 
Education 88 (6) 92 (1) 65 (-) 
Entrepreneurial 76 (2) 58 (-) 65 (15) 
Finance 63 (19) 82 (6) 50 (-) 
Overall GEI ranking 8 2 22 
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